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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 In his opening brief, Scott McAuley challenged the district court’s conclusion that 
the officer who encountered him initially pursuant to his community caretaking function 
could pursue a drug investigation after Mr. McAuley was medically cleared.  
Mr. McAuley argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because 
even though the officer had probable cause to believe he was driving without privileges, 
he did not write a ticket or arrest Mr. McAuley for that offense, but instead abandoned 
his investigation of that offense, and questioned Mr. McAuley at length about drugs.  In 
its brief, the State first argues that because the officer had probable cause to arrest 
Mr. McAuley for driving without privileges, “he did not need reasonable suspicion of a 
different offense in order to continue to detain [Mr.] McAuley.”  (Resp. Br., p.4.)  The 
State argues in the alternative that “the district court correctly concluded that Deputy 
Kinnan had reasonable suspicion to believe [Mr.] McAuley had been driving under the 
influence of narcotics[,] and could lawfully detain him to confirm or dispel that 
suspicion.”  (Resp. Br., p.4.)   
The State is incorrect.  A police officer can conduct a drug investigation that 
prolongs a person’s detention only if he has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 
person detained has committed, or is about to commit, a drug crime.  Here, the officer 
did not have such reasonable suspicion, but was instead acting on a hunch that there 
were drugs in Mr. McAuley’s vehicle.  The officer questioned Mr. McAuley at length 
about drugs, with the obvious intent of finding a reason to search his vehicle.  The 
officer’s questioning prolonged Mr. McAuley’s detention and violated his rights under the 
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Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  The district court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. McAuley included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his 
opening brief. (App. Br., pp.1-5.)  He includes this section here only to provide the 
additional facts necessary for the Court to consider the State’s arguments on appeal.   
After Mr. McAuley signed a medical release refusing further treatment,1 Deputy 
Garrett Kinnan aggressively questioned him with the intent of finding a reason to search 
his vehicle: 
 He first asked, “Are you sure there’s nothing in the vehicle I need to be 
aware of—drugs, drug paraphernalia, marijuana, pipe, anything like 
that?”  (Video at 20:59:55-21:00:03.) 
 
 He then asked, “What’s in the car that you can’t leave?”  (Video at 
21:01:30.) 
 
 He then asked, “Any large amounts of cash in the vehicle?” (Video at 
21:02:17.) 
 
 He then asked, “And, again, there’s no meth in your car?”  (Video at 
21:04:01.) 
 
 He then asked, “Is there any cocaine in your car?”  (Video at 21:04:20.) 
 
 He then asked, “Would you give me consent to search your vehicle?”  
(Video at 21:07:09.) 
 
 He then asked, “Is there anything illegal in this car?”  (Video at 
21:08:13.) 
 
                                            
1 The video reflects that Mr. McAuley signed the medical release at 20:58:24-20:59:08.  
In his opening brief, Mr. McAuley stated he signed the medical release at 20:52:24.  
(App. Br., p.2.)  This was a typographical error.   
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Mr. McAuley consistently denied there was anything illegal in his vehicle and did not 
consent to a search.  Deputy Kinnan then changed tactics and told Mr. McAuley that if 
he called a canine to run a sniff, and if the canine alerted, and if he searched the vehicle 
and found something inside, “You will go to jail.”  (Video at 21:08:24-38.)  In response, 
after approximately eleven minutes of questioning, Mr. McAuley told Deputy Kinnan he 
had a “small amount of personal methamphetamine in his vehicle.”  (Video at 21:09:28-
32.)  Deputy Kinnan then searched Mr. McAuley’s vehicle, arrested Mr. McAuley for 
possession of methamphetamine, and transported him to jail.  (R., pp.9, 10.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. McAuley’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. McAuley’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
While Mr. McAuley was being evaluated by paramedics, Deputy Kinnan learned 
Mr. McAuley’s driver’s license had been suspended for an insurance violation.  (R., p.7.)  
Mr. McAuley does not contest that under Idaho law, Deputy Kinnan could have arrested 
him for this offense.  However, Deputy Kinnan did not arrest him for this offense, but 
instead abandoned any inquiry into this offense, and questioned him at length about 
drugs.  The district court concluded Deputy Kinnan’s conduct was lawful because he 
had probable cause to believe Mr. McAuley was driving without privileges, and had 
reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. McAuley had been driving under the influence.  
Mr. McAuley does not contest that Deputy Kinnan had probable cause to believe he had 
been driving without privileges.  He contends, however, that as a matter of law, this did 
not allow Deputy Kinnan to detain him for approximately eleven minutes to question him 
about drugs.   
Deputy Kinnan prolonged Mr. McAuley’s detention to question him about drugs 
because of Mr. McAuley’s nervous behavior, the way he was answering questions, and 
the fact that he could not recall the exact date he was released from prison.  These 
factors did not establish reasonable suspicion of drug activity.  When he abandoned the 
driver’s license investigation and began a drug investigation without reasonable 
suspicion of drug activity, Deputy Kinnan violated Mr. McAuley’s rights under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  The district court thus erred in denying 
Mr. McAuley’s motion to suppress. 
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B. A Police Officer Can Conduct A Drug Investigation That Prolongs A Person’s 
Detention Only If He Has Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion That The Person 
Detained Has Committed, Or Is About To Commit, A Drug Crime  
 
The State appears to contend that where an officer has probable cause to arrest 
a person for one offense (here, driving without privileges), the officer can prolong the 
person’s detention and question him without limitation about other possible offenses 
(here, drug crimes).  The State is incorrect.  The fact that an officer has probable cause 
to arrest a person for one offense does not give the officer carte blanche to prolong a 
person’s detention to question him about unrelated offenses.  Deputy Kinnan prolonged 
Mr. McAuley’s detention to question him about drugs, and to find a way to search his 
vehicle.  The prolonged detention and drug investigation of Mr. McAuley was not 
supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion and was unlawful.   
The State asserts that Deputy Kinnan “did not need any basis for detaining 
[Mr.] McAuley in addition to the probable cause he had to detain and arrest 
[Mr.] McAuley for driving without privileges . . . .”  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  The State relies on 
State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609 (Ct. App. 2014), for the proposition that 
“reasonable suspicion of a different crime is only necessary for continuing a detention 
‘upon resolution of the initial justifications for the stop.’”  (Resp. Br., p.8 (quoting Perez-
Jungo, 156 Idaho at 615).)  According to the State, the initial justification for 
Mr. McAuley’s detention never ended because Deputy Kinnan could have arrested him 
at any time for driving without privileges.  (Resp. Br., pp.8-9.)  The fact that Deputy 
Kinnan did not arrest Mr. McAuley has legal significance. 
Deputy Kinnan did not arrest Mr. McAuley for driving with a suspended license 
and was not in the process of doing so after Mr. McAuley was medically cleared.  
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Instead, he abandoned the driver’s license investigation in an effort to find a way to 
search Mr. McAuley’s vehicle for drugs.  What the Court should consider is not whether 
the initial justification for the detention of Mr. McAuley ever ended, but whether it 
reasonably should have ended.  See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) 
(“A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver 
can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete 
that mission.”).  It is clear that Deputy Kinnan prolonged Mr. McAuley’s detention to 
pursue an unrelated drug investigation. 
Under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2209), Deputy Kinnan could not have 
searched Mr. McAuley’s vehicle if he had arrested him for driving without privileges.  
The United States Supreme Court held in Gant: 
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if 
the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at 
the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of arrest.  When these justifications are absent, a 
search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a 
warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement 
applies. 
 
556 U.S. at 351; see also State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 515 (2010) (concluding, 
under Gant, an officer’s warrantless search of the defendant’s truck violated the Fourth 
Amendment).  Deputy Kinnan had a hunch that Mr. McAuley had drugs in his vehicle, 
and wanted to find a way to search the vehicle.  He asked Mr. McAuley six times 
whether there was anything illegal in his vehicle and asked for consent to search his 
vehicle, which Mr. McAuley denied.  (See Statement of Facts and Course of 
Proceedings.)  This questioning prolonged Mr. McAuley’s detention and was in no way 
related to the offense of driving without privileges.  It was, in a word, unlawful. 
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“Where a person is detained, the scope of detention ‘must be carefully tailored to 
its underlying justification.’”  State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).)  The focus should be on the 
intensity, as well as the duration, of the detention.  See Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 361.  “It 
is the State’s burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a 
reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the 
conditions of an investigative seizure.”  Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.  The State did not and 
cannot meet its burden of demonstrating that Mr. McAuley’s continued detention was 
sufficiently limited in scope and duration to investigation of the offense of driving without 
privileges.   
 
C. Deputy Kinnan Did Not Have Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion That 
Mr. McAuley Had Committed, Or Was About To Commit, A Drug Crime  
 
Mr. McAuley argued in his opening brief that Deputy Kinnan did not articulate 
specific facts which, together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
justified his suspicion that criminal activity relating to drugs was occurring.  See State v. 
Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 409-10 (2012) (stating test for reasonable, articulable 
suspicion).  (App. Br., pp.8-13.)  In its brief, the State contends Mr. McAuley “ignores 
half of the factors noted by the district court and testified to by Deputy Kinnan.”  
(Resp. Br., p.11.)  Mr. McAuley acknowledges that Deputy Kinnan testified about the 
whole course of his encounter with Mr. McAuley;2 however, when asked to state the 
                                            
2 Among other things, Deputy Kinnan testified he initially observed Mr. McAuley “tossing 
his head back and forth” with his eyes shut “like he was having a bad dream.”  
(Tr., p.10, Ls.12-16, p.11, Ls.13-16.)  And he testified Mr. McAuley “appeared to be 
asleep or was having what seemed like a medical issue since he wouldn’t wake up.”  
(Tr., p.10, Ls.6-8.)   
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specific facts which led him to suspect that Mr. McAuley may have been driving under 
the influence of drugs, Deputy Kinnan spoke of Mr. McAuley’s nervous behavior, the 
way he was answering questions, and the fact that he could not recall the exact date he 
was released from prison.  (App. Br., pp.10-12.)  As Mr. McAuley argued in his opening 
brief, these factors did not establish reasonable suspicion of drug activity.  (App. 
Br., pp.12-13.) 
Because Deputy Kinnan abandoned the driver’s license investigation, for which 
he had probable cause, and did not have reasonable suspicion of drug activity, Deputy 
Kinnan’s extension of Mr. McAuley’s detention was unlawful.  See, e.g., State v. 
Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560 (Ct. App. 2005) (detention held to be unlawfully extended where 
officers abandoned investigation into traffic offense to pursue a drug investigation that 
was not supported by reasonable suspicion).  The district court should have granted 
Mr. McAuley’s motion to suppress and suppressed the evidence found in his vehicle 
along with the statements he made to Deputy Kinnan. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, as well as those in his opening brief, Mr. McAuley 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the district court’s 
denial of his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
 DATED this 26th day of July, 2016. 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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